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THE APPLICATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
TO PREDOMINANTLY "SERVICE" TRANSACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION.
Since 1960 many states have rejected the requirement that the plaintiff
must be in privity with the defendant seller to recover for injuries caused
by a defect in the defendant's product.' A corollary of this trend has been
an extension of the doctrine of implied warranties in the sale of goods.
The Uniform Commercial Code has had a great influence upon this de-
velopment.' However, there has been some question concerning when the
'Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In recent
years the courts of twenty-three states have rejected the privity rule. Arkansas [Delta Oxy-
gen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 634, 383 S.W. 2d 885 (1964)]; California [Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963)]; Connecticut [Hamon v.
Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961)]; Florida [Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201
So. 2d 440 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1967)]; Illinois [Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210
N.E. 2d 182 (1965)1; Iowa [State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
Inc. 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961)); Kansas [Chandler v. Anchor Serum Co., 198
Kan. 571, 426 P.2d 49 (1967)); Kentucky [Dealers Transport Co., Inc. v. Battery Distributing
Co., Inc., 402 S.W. 2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966)]; Michigan [Spense v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958)]; Minnesota [McCormack
v. Hankscraft Co., Inc., 154 N.W. 2d 488 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1967)); Mississippi [State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 269 F. Supp. 519, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1966)1; Missouri [Mor-
row v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W. 2d 138 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963)], [Hacker v. Rector,
353 F. Supp. 300 (D.C. Mo. 1966)]; New Jersey [Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)); New York [Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.
2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963)]; North Carolina [Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C.
485 (1967)); Ohio [Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185
(1966)); Oklahoma [Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1965)1; Oregon [Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965));
Pennsylvania [Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966)); South Carolina [Spring-
field v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., Inc. 153 S.E. 2d 184 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1967)); Tennessee
[Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1966)); Texas [Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Co., Inc. v. Tunks, 406 S.W. 2d 483 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966)); Washington
[Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wash. 2d 187, 401 P.2d 844 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1965)).
2Goods - §2-105; Sale - §2-106; Warranties - §§2-312-318. The Uniform Coin-
mercial Code has been adopted in every state of the union except Louisiana. It has also
been adopted in the District of Columbia.
Generally there are two implied warranties--one of fitness for a particular purpose and
one of merchantability. There are several differing historical developments for the implied
warranty. One theoretical basis is in the law of torts. There it originally was a misrepre-
sentation of fact. The action available was closely related to an action in common law
deceit except the scienter element was not necessary. Also, the seller's assertion could be
through his conduct and not his words. The essential element was, and is, reasonable
reliance by the buyer. Many courts require the presence of reasonable reliance before implying
a warranty - especially the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
The second theoretical basis is in the law of contracts. Here an agreement between
buyer and seller is found even though not expressed. It is said to be "implied in fact."
The usual description for this warranty remedy is indebitatus assumpsit. This action was
advantageous because it did not require setting forth all the details of the transaction.
This warranty does not rest upon the buyer's reliance upon the seller's special knowledge.
However, it is based on the intent of the parties.
The third theoretical basis is that directly imposed by the law. It arises merely because
there is a sale. The law reads a warranty into the transaction through the convenient ve-
hicle of public policy. The idea is to shift the loss to the one better equipped to bear it. This
is essentially liability without fault. Prosser, The Irmplied Warranty of Mferchantable Quality,
NOTES
implied warranties of the Code are properly applied. This note attempts
to explore the recent developments of one such questionable area-
implied warranties as applied to transactions which primarily involve the
sale of services rather than products.
The present analysis includes an historical development of the "sale-
service" distinction as applied to implied warranties and the subsequent
extensions of this sales doctrine to areas somewhat inconsistent with the
original policies. This article is not meant to expressly define the scope
of commercial implied warranties. Rather, the approach here is to exa-
mine the use of the "sale-service" distinction and to indicate that there is
no apparent reason for so limiting the scope of implied warranties. Thus,
an attempt is made to encourage the expansion of the implied warranty
doctrine by attacking the reasons underlying present and past limitations.
The logic is that if there is no reason to limit implied warranties by a
"sale-service" distinction, then implied warranties should not be so limited.
The stimulus of this discussion is a recent decision by the New Jersey
Superior Court in Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.' The case evolved from a
transaction between a beautician and one of his customers. Mrs. Newmark,
during one of her regular visits to Gimbel's Beauty Parlor, noticed a special
sale advertisement of a permanent wave treatment. Upon inquiry, the
beautician advised her against using the special treatment because her hair
was too fine and needed a "good" permanent wave. The beautician then
proceeded to give Mrs. Newmark a "good" permanent wave. The proce-
dure involved applying a lotion to Mrs. Newmark's hair, rinsing it several
times, and finally, the drying stage. Sometime after the treatment, Mrs.
Newmark lost an unusual amount of hair and her forehead became red
and blistered. A medical diagnosis by a dermatologist revealed that she
had contact dermatitis, causally linked to the hair solution. Mrs. New-
mark brought suit against Gimbels, Inc. for breach of implied warranties.
27 MINN. L REV. 117, 122-25 (1943); See also Ames, History of Assuampsit, 2 HARV. L. REV.
53, (1888); Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L
REV. 733 (1929).
For the precise elements of misrepresentation in seller-buyer transactions see 2 RESTATE-
M&ENT OF TORTS §402B (1965). See also Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St
244, 250, 147 N.R.2d 612, 616 (1958) [concurring opinion of C.J. Taft]. The elements
necessary for an action based on strict liability in tort are in 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §402
A (1965). Generally, in this discussion the warranty referred to will be an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose. Section 2-315 of the Uniform Commerdal Code defines
this implied warranty as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The word "sale" is defined in section 2-106 of the Code as "the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price." "Goods" are "all things ... which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale..... These definitions become particularly rele-
vant in determining whether implied warranties apply to commercial transactions in which
service predominates.
3 Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246A. 2d 11 (1968).
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The court held that the supplying of a product for use in administering
a permanent wave by a beautician carries with it an implied warranty
that the product used was reasonably fit for its intended purpose. The
court premised its analysis with the proposition that the instances in
which implied warranties may be imposed are not limited to "sales" that
come strictly within the definition in the Uniform Commercial Code
To support this proposition, the court referred to the official comment
to the warranty provisions in section 2-313 of the Code. The comment
expresses the view that the warranty section was "not designed in any
way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct
parties to such a contract." The court based its decision on policy rea-
sons considered applicable to both sales and service transactions.5 These
policies stress the buyers' reliance on the seller.6 The court went a step
further by ruling that the policies applicable to the sale of products justify
an extension of warranty liability to "any commercial transaction where
one person supplies a product to another .... "1 The rationale of this
holding seems to be that the profit maker should bear the risk of injury
since he is in the position to promote safety. Also, the seller can readily
pass the loss on to the supplier through indemnity actions.8 The decision
appears to be a significant step in limiting the broad application of the
"sale-service" distinction in service predominated transactions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SALE-SERVICE DISTINCTION.
A. The Sale of Food
Before the sale of food products was expressly denominated a "sale"
and not a service under the Uniform Commercial Code,' there was a signi-
ficant split in authority over this issue. An early common law notion
placed stricter duties upon one selling food than those selling other arti-
4 See discussion under roman numeral III, infra.
r 102 N.J. Super. 279,-, 246 A.2d 11,15 (1968).
61d. at -, 246 A.2d at 16 (1968); See HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §28.19
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 'THE LAW OF TORTS,
§97 (3rd. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER, TORTS).
7 102 N.J. Super. 279,-, 246 A.2d 11,15 (1968).
8 Id., see HARPER & JAMES, supra note 6; PROSSER, TORTS supra note 6; James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAS L REV. 44, 222 (1955); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). [concurring opinion of Justice Traynor]; Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties
of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoILuM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Comment, Contracts For Ser-
vices Distinguished From Those To Sell Goods, 15 FORD. L. REV. 92 (1946); Rapson, Products
Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between The Uniform Commercial Code and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692, 696 (1965). cf. Jaeger, Product Liability:
The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 501 (1964); 2 FRtJMER & FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §19.02.
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313.
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cles. Apparently Blackstone followed this notion. He is credited with
saying that "in contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are
wholesome."' 0  On the other hand, there was a critical distinction as to
who was selling the food.
Many decisions found that a restaurateur did not "sell" the food. He
was instead likened to the ancient innkeeper who "uttered" the food as
one of his several services.' The distinction was significant because if
the transfer was not deemed a sale, it was not covered by the law of implied
warranties as to the sale of goods. Based upon a "sale-service" distinc-
tion these two views developed differing lines that later became majority
and minority views.
Some courts recognized that a restaurateur differed from the ancient
innkeeper but were reluctant to abandon such distinguished precedent.'12
These courts reasoned that the customer does not ever own the food. It
is merely placed before him and he is privileged to eat what he can, but
cannot take away the uneaten portion. The only remedy available under
this reasoning is for lack of due care. 13  Some courts even seemingly re-
jected the sales requirement and still refused to find an implied warranty."4
Judge Augustus Hand suggested that "[i]f the food was unfit for consump-
tion, the remedy would be an action to recover back the purchase money,
if it had been paid."'5  This remedy is inadequate particularly where the
purchase has resulted in consuming the back half of a mouse,"° trichinae,'
fragments of glass,' a stone,19 or a few insects.20  It seems that recover-
ing the small purchase price cannot be adequate compensation for the
injury caused. However, several states followed the rule that an implied
warranty does not accompany the furnishing of food by a restaurateur.2
10 1 WILLISTON, THE LAw GOVEIRNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER
TlE UNIFORi SALES Acr, §181 (3rd. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
11id.
12 Mtferrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 317, 91 A. 533, 534 (1914); The Connecticut court
cited Lord Mansfield saying that "[t]he analogy between the two cases of an innkeeper and a
victualler [restaurateur] is so strong that it cannot be got over." Saunderson v. Rowles,
4 Burrows 2067, 2068.
1 3 BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS §§169, 302 (1906).
14 Valeri v. Pullman & Co., 218F. 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y., 1914).
15 Id.
16Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937).
17 Karger v. Armour & Co., 17 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1936).
18 Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936).
10 Savin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 NJ.L 421, 177 A. 120 (1935).
2 0 Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 98 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. App. 1936).
2 1 Alabama [Travis v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 183 Ala. 425, 62 So. 851 (1913), (fitness
of oysters served in a dining car)]; Connecticut [Merrill v. Hodson, supra note 12]; Georgia
[Rowe v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 29 Ga. App. 151, 113 SE. 823 (1922), (contaminated food
on dining car)]; Maryland [Childs Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105
(1938), (a piece of tin concealed in the food)]; New Hampshire [Kenney v. Wong Len, 81
N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925), (food containing a dead mouse); (see note 26, infra, this case
was deemed no longer controlling)]; and Delaware, note 22 infra.
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The argument that the proprietor of a restaurant was not an insurer and
that his customers merely had the privilege to eat has been followed in a
number of jurisdictions 2
Other jurisdictions have held that an implied warranty, expressing
that food is wholesome, does attach to the transfer. Some of these cases
expressly rejected the reliance upon the "uttering" concept.2 3 In Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall Co.,24 Chief Judge Rugg set down the Massachusetts
rule that an implied warranty expressing that the food is fit, could be
found either under the Sales Act or apart from it.25  He reasoned that
purchasing a meal includes all the products that make up the meal. This
expressly rejected the minority Connecticut-New Jersey rule. Doubts as
to the minority rule were acknowledged by the New Jersey court itself.
The court chose to distinguish the rule and found that an implied war-
ranty did accompany the transfer because it took place at a cafeteria and
not a restaurant.20 However, the need to so distinguish was probably
abolished along with the rule when the New Jersey legislature adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code.27
In Wisconsin the "sale-service" distinction was considered as a case
of first impression in Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp.28 The state Supreme
Court reasoned that the Connecticut-New Jersey rule was based upon an
old "boardinghouse" theory and was inconsistent with conditions in
modern restaurants. The conclusion was that the sale of food in a restau-
rant gives rise to an implied warranty of fitness for consumption and a
recovery of damages could be had.
The foregoing summary of the differing lines of food cases indicates
the ability of the law to build a general policy rule from a minor and
ancient distinction. It seems that relying upon the antequated role of
the innkeeper to decide whether one warrants the quality of his food is
somewhat preposterous. An implied warranty did not accompany the
transfer because the food was "uttered" and not because the food was not
a saleable product. The sale of food is now expressly made a sale within
the meaning of the Code.29  The significance of that denomination is that
it seems to be an a priori matter that the "serving" aspect of the trans.
action does not keep it from being a sale covered by the law of implied
warranty.
22 Pappa v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 33 A.2d 310 (Del. Super. Ct., 1943).
23 Heisev. Gillette, 83 Ind._App. 551, 149 N.E. 182 (1925).
24231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918).
25Chief Judge Rugg relied on Massachusetts and English precedent. See Farrell v. Man-
hattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908).
268 ofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc, 37 N.J. 304, 181 A. 2d 168 (1962).
27Id., 37 N.J. 304, 308,181 A.2d 168,170.
28 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).




Probably the leading case for the proposition that an implied war-
ranty does not apply where service predominates in a transaction is the
New York case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.30 The case involved
an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly due to the
transfusion of impure blood. The plaintiff, who was a paying patient at
the hospital, sought recovery on the theory of a breach of warranty. The
New York Court of Appeals through the opinion of Judge Fuld held that
the injured plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action for
breach of implied warranty. The court reasoned that "[s]uch a contract is
clearly one for services . . ." and therefore an implied warranty does not
apply.31 Judge Fuld admitted the difficulty of determining whether the
essence of a particular contract is for services or for a sale of property.
However, he went on to say that the main object of the contract was care
and treatment of the patient and not the purchase of blood. Perhaps
the real basis of the decision was an underlying policy to limit the liabil-
ity of hospitals. Judge Fuld suggested this when he said:
to stamp as a sale the supplying of blood . . .would mean that the hos-
pital, no matter how careful... would be held responsible, virtually as an
insurer, if anything were to happen to the patient as a result of 'bad'
blood.32
In Napoli v. St. Peter's Hospital of Brooklyn,"3 the New York Supreme
Court of Kings County considered another blood transfusion case. The
question there was whether, even assuming that the transaction was not
a sale of blood, a cause of action would lie based upon breach of an ex-
press warranty by the hospital staff. Judge DiGiovanna reviewed the
language of Per/mutter and correctly concluded that Perlmutter was based
upon the theory of implied warranty and the question of express war-
ranty had not been decided. He then stated that the subject matter in-
volved was a valid subject for a contract and denied the motion to dismiss.
Even though the court did not mention the policy of protecting hospitals,
it is doubtful that this policy was ignored. The probable effect of the
decision was a personal contract between individual parties, and the hos-
pital did not face liability. The significance of this case may be that it
limited Per/mutter to implied warranties. Obviously, the decision is not
inconsistent with the policy bases expressed in Per/mutter.
The New York Court of Appeals had a chance to reconsider the Perl-
mutter decision in Payton v. Brooklyn Hospital.34 An action was brought
30 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (Cr. App., 1954).
31Id. 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
32 d., at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
93 213 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
34 19 N.Y. 2d 610,224 N.E.2d 891 (1967).
1970]
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to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's wife allegedly due to a
transfusion of impure blood. The complaint was based on an allegation
that the deceased wife had received blood contaminated with serum hepa-
titis. The complaint was dismissed by the New York Supreme Court and
the dismissal was affirmed by the appellate division. The plaintiff then
appealed to the court of appeals maintaining that the transfer of blood was
a sale and that therefore it was impliedly warranted to be pure. The
court of appeals, without an opinion, affirmed the order to dismiss the
complaint. This seems to dearly indicate the law in New York on the
matter.
Many jurisdictions follow the Perlmutter rule as to the supplying of
blood by a hospital to a paying patient. A 1967 Georgia case, Lovet v.
Emory University, Inc.,;" involved a wrongful death action allegedly due
to serum hepatitis contracted from a blood transfusion. The trial court
had sustained a general demurrer to the petition and an appeal was taken.
The court of appeals stated that furnishing blood for a transfusion is inci-
dental to the service provided by the hospital and is not a sales transaction
covered by an implied warranty. Obviously, this was following the rea-
soning of Perlmutter.
Most courts citing Perlmutter merely refer to the statement that sup-
plying blood is not a sale and therefore an action based upon implied
warranty will not lie.36 There is little mention of such other factors as
the difficulty of avoiding hepatitis virus by inspecting the blood or the
policy of protecting a non-profit hospital from liability. However, there
are indications that some courts are beginning to recognize the unique-
ness of Perlmutter. In a New Jersey case, Magrine v. Krasnica,I Judge
Lynch of the superior court made mention of Perlmutter and indicated
the significance of whether or not the hospital staff could completely
avoid the use of impure blood. The Magrine case was an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained when a hypodermic needle broke off
in plaintiff's jaw. The defendant was a dentist. Judge Lynch indi-
cated that the opportunity for avoidance of the injury was perhaps a more
valid ground for dismissal than the "sale-service" distinction. This indica-
tion that the real basis of the Perlmutter decision was not the "sale-service"
distinction seems to be the more realistic view.3 Some courts, in con-
sidering this type of case, have also indicated a reliance upon the public
policy of protecting non-profit hospitals from liability. In Koenig v. AMil-
waukee Blood Center, Inc.,39 the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered an
35 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
36Id.
37 94 N.J. Super. 228,227 A.2d 539 (1967).
38 New Jersey rejected Perlmutter in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314,
232 A.2d 879 (1967).
39 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
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action by a hospital patient for injuries from hepatitis. The complaint
alleged that the plaintiff had contracted hepatitis from a transfusion
of impure blood. This was a case of first impression for the Wisconsin
court so it turned to the Perlmutter case. However, the court noted that
the amended complaint alleged a cause of action for breach of warranty
against the hospital and not against the blood center. Therefore, the
court declined to decide whether or not a cause of action for breach of
warranty could be made against the blood center. But a Florida Court
of Appeals decision, Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,40 supports
the notion that the basis of these decisions is really a policy to protect non-
profit organizations from liability.41 The suit was brought against a blood
bank for breach of an implied warranty in the sale of blood. The trial
court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. The question
that the Wisconsin court in Koenig had recognized but had declined to
decide was before this court. The Perlmutter case had been brought
against a hospital whereas the case at bar was against a blood bank. The
court reasoned that the significant factor in the hospital cases was not the
"sale-service" distinction for which Perlmutter is commonly cited. It was
actually the medical inability to detect the presence of the virus or ef-
fectively remove it from the blood. The court then referred to a Minne-
sota case Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.,42
another blood transfusion case. Although an action against a blood bank
and not a hospital, the Minnesota court noted that the blood bank was a
non-profit corporation. After discussing the limited medical knowledge
as to detecting this serum, the court indicated what seems to be the gen-
eral policy reason underlying these blood transfusion cases.
"We find it difficult to give literal application of principles of law de-
signed to impose strict accountability in commercial transactions to a vol-
untary and charitable activity which serves a humane and public health
purpose."43
The Florida court in Russell noted this concern over the public policy in-
volved in the question and applied it to the case at bar. It felt "compelled"
to disregard the "sale-service" distinction and examine the question on
the basis of implied warranty. The court reasoned that it is "a distortion
to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a ser-
vice, and then employ this transformed material in erecting the frame-
work of a major policy decision." 44  Acting Chief Judge Shannon pro-
ceeded to state the predominate elements of the rationale for denying
40 185 So. 2d 749 (1966) afld 196 So. 2d 115 (1967).
4 1 In fact, many states have enacted statutes which expressly exempt charitable institutions
from tort liability.
42 270 Afinn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
43Id., 159, 132 N.W.2d 811 (1965).
44 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (1966).
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liability in the blood transfusion cases. First, since the defect which
causes the virus in the blood cannot readily be detected, it is against public
policy to hold hospitals and blood banks strictly liable "when they are
supplying a commodity essential to health."45  Second, blood suppliers
are non-profit organizations and do not advertise to the general public to
increase the demand for their product. Third, the patient's reliance is upon
the physician's expertise and not upon that of the blood supplier. These
indicia were deemed to be the actual bases of the Perlmutter line of de-
cisions. The Florida court then alluded to the California appellate case
of Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories,46 where a drug manufacturer was
sued for breach of implied warranty due to the sale of Salk polio vaccine.
The California court had analogized the reasoning of the California rule
as to food products to that of polio vaccine. Judge Draper stated that
"[t]he vaccine is intended for human consumption quite as much as
food."47 The Florida court in Russell felt that the same analogy was ap-
plicable to the sale of blood. Therefore, the court held that a cause of ac-
tion based upon implied warranty could be stated against a blood bank.
The foregoing indicates the actual rationale of the alleged Perlmutter
"sale-service" distinction. Public policy reasons were actually at the heart
of the decisions. It will be helpful to keep those reasons in mind when
we consider the judicial extension of the distinction.
III. VAIuous APPLICATIONS OF THE DISTINCTION.
A. Extending the Blood Transfusion Rule
The Perlmutter rule as generally stated is that when service predomi-
nates, and a transfer of personal property is only incidental, the transac-
tion is not a sale and therefore warranties do not attach. As discussed
above, the rationale of the rule is really based on a public policy unique
to the blood cases.48 However, the "sale-service" distinction has not been
so limited. In Aegis Productions, Inc. v. Ai'riflex Corporation of
America,49 the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York con-
sidered an action alleging a breach of warranty due to improper repair of
a motion picture camera. The court, per curiam, held that there was no
such cause of action because warranties were limited to the sale of goods.
The court cited Perlmutter and stated that warranties did not attach to the
performance of services, and only an action for negligence is available.50
Thus, the New York court extended the "sale-service" distinction in Per!-
45Id.
46 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1960).
47 Id.
4 8 Alaska, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, and South Carolina have
statutes explicitly stating that blood is not subject to sale.
49 268 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1966).
5o Id. at 187.
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mutter to repairs. The court made no attempt to consider the rationale
of the Perlmutter rule. The policy of protecting non-profit hospitals from
liability for defects in blood, which were practically impossible to detect,
was not mentioned. Only the "sale-service" distinction was regarded as
relevant precedent. A Louisiana case, Airco Refrigeration Serv., Inc. v.
Fink,"' further demonstrates this judicial extension. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana maintained that a contract for the installation of an air
conditioner was not a sale. This principle has been followed in construc-
tion contract cases where the furnishing of materials is held to be only
incidental to the work and labor performed. Thus, the transaction does
not come within the purview of the sales requirement.
In a Connecticut case, Epstein v. Giannattasio,5 2 a beauty parlor patron,
who suffered acute dermatitis allegedly due to a beauty treatment, brought
an action based on breach of warranty. The operator of the beauty parlor
demurred to the breach of warranty cause of action. The Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Fairfield County referred to Connecticut "sale of food"
cases. The Connecticut rule was that the serving of food in a restaurant
is not a saleY3 The court then explained that the only thing provided is
the personal service of preparing and presenting the food. It concluded
that since service is the predominate feature of the transaction, the trans-
fer of personal property is incidental and there is no sale of goods. Thus,
an implied warranty was not found to protect the beauty parlor patron
from the harmful products used by the beautician. An indication of the
inconsistency in the application of the "sale-service" distinction is exempli-
fied by comparing Epstein with Sicard v. Kr'emer.! In Sicard a beauty
parlor operator brought an action for personal injuries received from a
hair dye distributed by the defendant. The Ohio Supreme Court found
that a seller owes a duty beyond the mere contract. This duty was to re-
frain from including in the articles any dangerous substance unknown to
the buyer. The court concluded that there was an obligation that the
goods will be fit for their intended purpose. A breach of this obligation
was deemed to be a breach of an implied warranty. Thus, it would appear
that a beauty operator in Ohio who has her hands injured by a beauty
product can recover on the basis of implied warranty. However, if the
beauty operator had been applying the same beauty product to the hair of
a customer in Connecticut, the injured customer would not be covered by
an implied warranty. 5 It seems obvious that the "sale-service" distinc-
tion is one of form and not one of substance.
t1 242 La. 73, 134 So. 2d 880 (1961).
02 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
53 Supra note 21.
r,133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.X.2d 250 (1938).
5 However, Connecticut accepts the doctrine of strict liability in tort so that the pa-
tron may recover against the manufacturer under that theory.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. Bailments and Implied Warranty
There is authority for the proposition that a bailor for hire impliedly
warrants that the product he supplies is reasonably fit for its intended pur-
pose. Probably the most commonly cited case for this proposition is
Hoisting Engine Sales Co., Inc. v. Hart."( The case involved the leasing
of a hoist to defendant for constructural work. The defendant installed
the traveler and hoist to lift large pipes and place them in a trench.
However, the hoist broke when this was attempted. The Hoisting Com-
pany then sued Hart for damaging the hoist. Hart counterclaimed on
the basis of an implied warranty. The New York Court of Appeals
through the opinion of Judge Crane considered whether an action for
breach of implied warranty was available. The court noted that by anal-
ogy there is an implied warranty in the hiring or bailment of certain kinds
of property. Judge Crane concluded that since the plaintiff owned a
traveler with a hoist for digging and lifting work and had hired it to
defendant to do such work, there was an implied warranty "that the thing
would do the work." It is noteworthy that Judge Crane further explained:
The defendant does not claim that there was a warranty that this machine
would do a special class of work for which it might or might not be
adapted; [but] ... the class of work which its nature indicates it was in-
tended to perform. 57
Thus, an implied warranty that the hoist was reasonably fit for "digging
and lifting" was found to exist even though the relationship of the parties
was that of bailor-bailee and not one of vendor-vendee.
In a Washington case, Hatten Machinery Co. v. Bruch,r"8 an action
was brought by a lessor of earth moving equipment to recover allegedly
unpaid rental and incidental charges. The lessee counterclaimed that the
equipment did not perform as the lessor had warranted. Apparently,
the defendant was engaged in constructing a road for a logging company
and had informed plaintiff of his need for earth removers or scrapers to
load and transport gravel. The Washington Supreme Court in the opinion
by Chief Justice Finley, indicated that the evidence dearly showed that
the scrapers provided were inadequate. The court then concluded on the
basis of rules analogous to sales law, "the roots of which are imbedded
in the common law," that an implied warranty attached to the transaction.59
Admittedly, both the Hoisting case and Hatten Machinery were actions
for a recovery of money expended on the article leased and not for per-
sonal injuries. However, there are a few cases which apply implied war-
ranties to a bailment transaction in an action due to personal injuries.
56 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923).
5 7d.at 37, 142 N.E. at 344. See Seely v. White Motor Co., infra note 68.
5859 Wash. 2d 757, 370 P.2d 600 (1962).
59 Id. at 761, 370 P.2d 603.
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One such case involved a claim for personal injuries sustained when
plaintiff fell while roller skating. The case was Covello v. New York,6"
a 1959 Court of Claims action predicated upon an implied warranty that
the skates rented to plaintiff were fit and suitable for skating. Plaintiff
had rented a pair of clamp skates from the defendant and after about two
minutes of skating the rollers came loose and plaintiff fell. The plaintiff
sustained a broken leg and lost six weeks of work. The court, relying on
Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, said that when plaintiff paid her en-
trance fee and received a pair of skates and used them, a bailor-bailee re-
lationship was created for mutual benefit. The court further stated that
an implied warranty of fitness for use arises in bailment as well as sales
cases. It then held that defendant had breached an implied warranty
that the skates hired by plaintiff were reasonably fit for the purposes for
which they were hired. The court awarded the sum of $5,500 for per-
sonal injuries and medical bills.
In most bailor-bailee warranty cases there seems to be some confusion
over what is warranted. An example is Butler v. Northwestern Hospital
of Ainneapolis,01 a 1938 case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In
its syllabus, the court stated that a person furnishing an instrumentality
for a special use or service impliedly warrants that it is reasonably fit and
suitable for that purpose. However, in the opinion of Justice Olson, it
added the words ".. . and is liable for injuries to the bailee or third persons
for injuries proximately resulting from any defect due to this want of due
care."" 2 This would appear to indicate some confusion between the strict
warranty standard and negligent disregard of due care.
In Hoisting, the court relied upon an 1874 Massachusetts case in find-
ing an implied warranty. 6  The case was for personal injuries. Thus,
implied warranties have been found to cover bailor-bailee relationships,
in some cases even as to personal injuries. The obvious significance of
this fact here is that the implied warranty concept is being used even
though the transaction was not a sale.
C. Contracts for Labor and Material
In a California case, Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co.,6" the ques-
tion was whether an implied warranty could be found if the transaction
was not a sale. Aced had contracted to build a home with a radiant heat-
ing system installed in a concrete slab floor. Hobbs, a subcontractor,
agreed with Aced to furnish the necessary labor and materials and installed
00 17 Misc. 2d 637, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 396 (1959).
01202 Minn. 282, 278 N.W. 37 (1938).
62 Id. at 285, 278 N.W. at 38.
03 Home v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326 (1874).
04 55 Cal. 2d 573, 581, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
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the system. The system proved faulty and had to be replaced. The
homeowners brought an action against Aced for damages. Aced's cross-
complaint named Hobbs as a cross-defendant upon the theory that there
had been a breach of an implied warranty. In determining whether there
was an implied warranty, the court first considered whether there was a
sale. It noted prior applications of the Massachusetts rule that there is not
a sale where the person supplying the labor and materials incorporated
the product into a building. Chief Justice Gibson decided that in this
type of situation the test was
... not whether the materials used were specially manufactured for the
particular work but whether the finished product in which they are in-
corporated is specially constructed for the job and not suitable for use in
the ordinary course of the contractor's business.65
He then concluded that the present contract was not a sale, but one for
labor and material. However, there may nevertheless be an implied war-
ranty. Justice Gibson then noted that for historical reasons implied war-
ranties had become identified primarily with transactions involving a sale,
but they were not so confined. He concluded that
[tjhere is no justification for refusing to imply a warranty of suitability
for ordinary uses merely because an article is furnished in connection with
a construction contract rather than one of sale.66
This language in the Aced case seems particularly significant in relation
to so-called "service" predominated transactions. The test suggested by
former Chief Justice Gibson of the California Supreme Court appears to
indicate that there is no justification for refusing to apply the concept of
implied warranties to the "service" type contract."
The question may be whether Justice Gibson's test is applicable when
the particular product causes personal injuries. There seems to be no
basis within the Code definitions to limit the recoveries to the value of
the product or the economic loss. However, there are some who main-
tain that the law of sales is to govern only the economic relations be-
tween suppliers and consumers of goods. Under this approach injuries
to the consumer would be compensated through other remedies. In the
words of Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
[tjhe distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physi-
cal injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss .. . rests on an under-
standing of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must under-
take in distributing his products. 68
651d. at 581, 360 P.2d at 901.
661d. at 583, 360 P.2d at 902.
67 See Mack v. Hugh W. Cornstock Associates, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964); cf. Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492 (1963).
68 Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,23, 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965).
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He then explains that a manufacturer can be liable for physical injuries
due to defective goods where his goods create unreasonable risks of harm.
However, the manufacturer should not be liable for the level of perform-
ance of his product except where he has agreed that the product was
designed to meet the consumer's demands. This distinction does not ap-
pear particularly helpful where a product causes personal injury whether
or not the "level of performance" of the product was guaranteed. If the
idea is that this person should be able to recover in tort, as Justice Traynor
suggests, that is a distinction. However, it seems that the responsibilities
of the manufacturer or seller should include personal injuries caused by
their defective products regardless of the level of performance. The real
reasoning seems to be that since actions for negligence and actions for strict
liability in tort are limited to physical harm, then actions for breach of
warranty should be limited to economic loss. Strict liability in tort has been
recognized in eighteen states. 9 An implied warranty doctrine has been
accepted in eleven states and the District of Columbia.70 However, it still
may be questionable whether the service predominated transaction is cov-
ered. In commenting to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, the
American Law Institute stated that they expressed no opinion as to whether
the rule applied to the seller of a product expected to be processed or sub-
stantially changed before reaching the consumer.71 However, some states
69Arizona [Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108 (1967)1;
California [Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963)3;
Connecticut [Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965)]; Illinois [Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)]; Indiana [Greeno v. Clark Equip-
ment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (D. Ind., 1965)]; Kentucky [Dealers Transport Co., Inc. v. Bat-
tery Distributing Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. cr. App. 1966); Pennsylvania [Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)]; Tennessee [Ford Motor Co. v. Loion, 217 Tenn. 400,
398 S.W.2d 240 (1966)]; Texas [McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.
Sup. Ct. 1967)]; Wisconsin [Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967)].
70 Arkansas [Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964)); District
of Columbia [Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1962)]; Florida [Manhein v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1967)); Hawaii
[Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Haw. 1961) aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cit. 1962)];
Indiana [Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 334 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965)); Iowa [State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 499
(1961)]; Louisiana [Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (D. La. 1946)]; North
Carolina [Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485 (1967)1; Michigan [Browne v.
Ferestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965)); Minnesota [McCormack v. Hank-
scraft Co., Inc. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)]; Mississippi [State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (1966) cert. den'd 386 U.S. 912)]; Missiuri [Morrow v. Caloric
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Sup. Ct 1963)]; Nevada [Shoshone Coca-Cola Bot-
ling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966)]; New Jersey [Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)]; New York [Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963)]; Ohio [Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965) aff'd 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1965)]; Oklahoma [Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. Sup. Ct 1965)];
Oregon [Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965)]; South Carolina
[Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967)];
Vermont [Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963)); Washington [Brewer
v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wash. 187, 401 P.2d 844 (1965)].
7 1 Official Comment, RESTAEENT oF TORTS §402 A.
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have merely brought beauty parlor transactions within the "food" excep-
tion.7 2 It would appear that, at least in states not accepting strict liability
in tort, Justice Gibson's test would be equally applicable to commercial
transactions where a product is involved notwithstanding the fact that
the product is administered to the customer.
IV. CONCLUSION.
In Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.,73 supra, the New Jersey Superior Court
considered a beauty parlor transaction and its relationship to the concept
of implied warranty. The Connecticut case of Epstein v. Giannattasio,4
was authority for denying recovery on the basis of implied warranty.
This case was discussed by the Newmark court, while other decisions deny-
ing recovery in a similar situation were not mentioned.75  However, the
Connecticut court in Epstein had looked to Connecticut cases on service
of food in restaurants for their authority. Specifically, the court men-
tioned Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co.,78 where the furnishing of food in a
restaurant was held not to be a sale. The basis of that decision was
largely the antiquated "uttering" of food concept. It seems that the New
Jersey Superior Court in Newmark was justified in rejecting the "uttering"
cases as relevant authority.
The Epstein court also relied upon the Perlmutter rule in blood trans-
fusion cases to substantiate its holding that there was not a sale of goods
and therefore no implied warranty. Hopefully, the earlier analysis of
the Perlmutter rationale points out the weakness of this authority. The
policy reasons which apparently were the basis of the blood transfusion
"sale-service" distinction seem clearly to justify the Newmark court's re-
jection of that authority. Also, the court in Epstein completely ignored
the possibility of implying a warranty in the absence of a sale.7 We
have seen that ignoring the possibility of an implied warranty being
applicable to other transactions is ignoring a substantial amount of case
law to the contrary.7
A relevant question is whether Newmark is limited to its facts. The
indications are that it is not. The New Jersey court itself felt that the
policy reasons involved in sales cases should extend warranty liability to
any commercial transaction where one person supplied a product to an-
other. This statement is significant because it brings the Newmark situa-
72 Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501,370P.2d 116 (1962).
73102 N.J. Super. 279,246 A.2d 11 (1968).
74 Supra note 52.
7 5 See 2 FRumR AND FluDMAN, PRoDuCrs IIABILAn= §19.02, n.1.
76 117 Conn. 128, 167 A. 99 (1933). In this case the Connecticut court decided to follow
the rule of Merrill v. Hodson, see note 12 supra.
77 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 111, 197 A.2d 342,343.
7 8 See sections on bailments and contracts for labor and materials, supra.
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tion within the test used in labor and material cases.79  The test notes a
distinction between attaching the warranty to the product used in the
construction process and the finished product. The materials used are in-
corporated into a finished product which is specially constructed for this
particular job. The Newmark court may have alluded to this reasoning
when it mentioned that the beauty product was used up in the process of
giving Mrs. Newmark a permanent wave. 0 An effective argument might
have been made that the permanent wave was constructed especially for
Mrs. Newmark. The finished product was not subject to use in the beauty
parlor's ordinary business, but was fit for this customer alone. Under this
test, the warranty is applied to the finished product, itself, and not to the
materials consumed in the construction process. The rationale of the
case logically extends to all commercial transfers of products notwith-
standing the element of service. The abandonment of the "sale-service"
distinction in cases where there is a commercial transfer of products ap-
pears to be justified by the policy involved. The additional element of
service should not logically preclude the application of a warranty. Since
the "sale-service" distinction has been shown to have a basis in situations
peculiar to their facts, it is realistic to end its extension. Newmark refuses
to apply the distinction. The foregoing analysis has attempted to indicate
the correctness of that view.
A. Mark Segreti, pr.
79 Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack, 55 Cal. 2d 573,360 P.2d 897 (1961) supra note 64.
80 Supra note 73, 246 A.2d at 16.
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